-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 2
Description
Context
In the event of a TCB Recovery , all of the TEE registrations that use that vulnerable TCB will need to be invalidated. If we don't do this, then those registered TDX devices could be used to put out fake but verifiable attestations and subvert the systems that use them
Problem
Our current process for invalidating these TEE registrations is costly; it requires calling invalidateAttestations all existing TEE registrations, which might be 10's of them since we plan to deploy a new TDX device every week. This operation is costly because it requires calling the Automata verifyAndAttestOnChain function and verifying the whole attestation onchain. This is also operationally a burdensome.
Potential Solution
We still need to nail down exactly what code within flashtestations and automata needs to change, but it's clear it's possible for each call to BlockBuilderPolicy:isAllowedPolicy to check if the workload's TEE registration is using a vulnerable TCB, and then use that information to invalidate the registration cheaply.