Gradle update (#214)

* Upgrade gradle to 8.5

* update

* Removed suppress for - CVE-2023-4586

* undoing last commit

* CVE-2023-44487 Suppress Fixed

* removed suppression

* removed suppression

Author: patelraj0602

gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 distributionBase=GRADLE_USER_HOME
 distributionPath=wrapper/dists
-distributionUrl=https\://services.gradle.org/distributions/gradle-8.3-all.zip
+distributionUrl=https\://services.gradle.org/distributions/gradle-8.5-all.zip
 networkTimeout=10000
 validateDistributionUrl=true
 zipStoreBase=GRADLE_USER_HOME

gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties

@@ -145,15 +145,15 @@ if ! "$cygwin" && ! "$darwin" && ! "$nonstop" ; then
     case $MAX_FD in #(
       max*)
         # In POSIX sh, ulimit -H is undefined. That's why the result is checked to see if it worked.
-        # shellcheck disable=SC3045
+        # shellcheck disable=SC2039,SC3045
         MAX_FD=$( ulimit -H -n ) ||
             warn "Could not query maximum file descriptor limit"
     esac
     case $MAX_FD in  #(
       '' | soft) :;; #(
       *)
         # In POSIX sh, ulimit -n is undefined. That's why the result is checked to see if it worked.
-        # shellcheck disable=SC3045
+        # shellcheck disable=SC2039,SC3045
         ulimit -n "$MAX_FD" ||
             warn "Could not set maximum file descriptor limit to $MAX_FD"
     esac
@@ -202,11 +202,11 @@ fi
 # Add default JVM options here. You can also use JAVA_OPTS and GRADLE_OPTS to pass JVM options to this script.
 DEFAULT_JVM_OPTS='"-Xmx64m" "-Xms64m"'
 
-# Collect all arguments for the java command;
-#   * $DEFAULT_JVM_OPTS, $JAVA_OPTS, and $GRADLE_OPTS can contain fragments of
-#     shell script including quotes and variable substitutions, so put them in
-#     double quotes to make sure that they get re-expanded; and
-#   * put everything else in single quotes, so that it's not re-expanded.
+# Collect all arguments for the java command:
+#   * DEFAULT_JVM_OPTS, JAVA_OPTS, JAVA_OPTS, and optsEnvironmentVar are not allowed to contain shell fragments,
+#     and any embedded shellness will be escaped.
+#   * For example: A user cannot expect ${Hostname} to be expanded, as it is an environment variable and will be
+#     treated as '${Hostname}' itself on the command line.
 
 set -- \
         "-Dorg.gradle.appname=$APP_BASE_NAME" \

gradlew

@@ -8,25 +8,4 @@
     <cpe>cpe:/a:grpc:grpc</cpe>
     <cpe>cpe:/a:utils_project:utils</cpe>
   </suppress>
-  <suppress until="2023-12-31Z">
-    <notes><![CDATA[
-  This vulnerability is disputed, with the argument that SSL configuration is the responsibility of the client rather
-  than the transport. The change in default is under consideration for the next major Netty release, revisit then.
-  Regardless, our client (which is what brings in this dependency) enables the concerned feature, hostname verification
-  Ref:
-  https://github.com/grpc/grpc-java/issues/10033
-  https://github.com/netty/netty/issues/8537#issuecomment-1527896917
-   ]]></notes>
-    <packageUrl regex="true">^pkg:maven/io\.netty/netty.*@.*$</packageUrl>
-    <vulnerabilityName>CVE-2023-4586</vulnerabilityName>
-  </suppress>
-  <suppress until="2023-12-31Z">
-    <notes><![CDATA[
-   This CVE (rapid RST) is already mitigated as our servers aren't directly exposed, but it's also
-   addressed in 1.59.1, which the CVE doesn't reflect (not all grpc impls versions are exactly aligned).
-   Ref: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-java/pull/10675
-   ]]></notes>
-    <packageUrl regex="true">^pkg:maven/io\.grpc/grpc\-.*@.*$</packageUrl>
-    <cve>CVE-2023-44487</cve>
-  </suppress>
 </suppressions>