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Create signature for DLL sideloading #504
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Initial signature for one behaviour that appears in some sideloading cases. For this to trigger either zip_compound needs to be used triggering the correct file that then sideloads the DLL or within the chain naturally (i.e. a loader/malicious script/doc etc. pulls down the elements needed itself and sideloads it. Some other sigs will need investigated for anomalies on this which I am looking into but this should detect some cases.
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Summary of Changes
Hello @kevross33, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed!
This pull request introduces a new security signature designed to identify and flag instances of DLL sideloading or search order hijacking. By monitoring DLL load notifications and checking the origin directory against a whitelist of legitimate system paths, the signature aims to enhance the detection of sophisticated malware techniques, thereby strengthening the platform's ability to identify malicious behavior.
Highlights
- New Signature for DLL Sideloading: A new Cuckoo signature,
DLLLoadSuspiciousDirectory, has been added to detect malicious DLL loading from non-standard locations. - Suspicious Directory Detection: The signature identifies DLLs loaded from directories that are not part of a predefined whitelist of legitimate Windows system paths, indicating potential sideloading or search order hijacking.
- API Monitoring: The detection mechanism specifically monitors
DllLoadNotificationAPI calls to identify when a DLL is loaded and subsequently checks its origin. - Exclusion List: An internal list of common, legitimate Windows directories (e.g.,
c:\windows\system32\,c:\program files\) is used to prevent false positives for standard DLL loads.
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a new signature to detect potential DLL sideloading by checking for DLLs loaded from suspicious directories. The implementation is a good start. My review includes a suggestion to simplify the code by removing redundant logic and to make the signature's report more informative for analysts.
| class DLLLoadSuspiciousDirectory(Signature): | ||
| name = "dllload_suspicious_directory" | ||
| description = "A DLL was loaded from a suspicious directory" | ||
| severity = 2 | ||
| confidence = 50 | ||
| categories = ["side loading"] | ||
| authors = ["Kevin Ross"] | ||
| minimum = "1.3" | ||
| evented = True | ||
| enabled = True | ||
| ttps = ["T1574"] # MITRE v6,7,8 | ||
| mbcs = ["F0015"] | ||
|
|
||
| def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): | ||
| Signature.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs) | ||
| self.ret = False | ||
| # Any exclusions added to this list needs to be in lower format. | ||
| self.ignore_directories = [ | ||
| "c:\\windows\\system32\\", | ||
| "c:\\windows\\syswow64\\", | ||
| "c:\\windows\\", | ||
| "c:\\windows\\winsxs\\", | ||
| "c:\\program files\\", | ||
| "c:\\program files (x86)\\", | ||
| "c:\\programdata\\", | ||
| ] | ||
|
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| filter_apinames = set(["DllLoadNotification"]) | ||
|
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| def on_call(self, call, process): | ||
| if not call["status"]: | ||
| return None | ||
|
|
||
| if call["api"] == "DllLoadNotification": | ||
| notificationreason = self.get_argument(call, "NotificationReason") | ||
| dllname = self.get_argument(call, "DllName") | ||
| if notificationreason == "load": | ||
| pname = process["process_name"].lower() | ||
| dllnamelower = dllname.lower() | ||
| is_ignored = any(dllnamelower.startswith(d) for d in self.ignore_directories) | ||
| if not is_ignored: | ||
| self.mark_call() | ||
| self.data.append({"suspicious_dll_load": "Process %s loaded a DLL from a suspicious directory, this is possibly indicative of DLL side loading/search order hijacking" % (pname)}) | ||
| self.ret = True | ||
|
|
||
| def on_complete(self): | ||
| return self.ret |
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This is a good signature. I have a few suggestions to simplify the code and make the report more informative:
- The
if call["api"] == "DllLoadNotification":check inon_callis redundant becausefilter_apinamesis set. This check can be removed. - The report message would be more useful for analysts if it included the
dllname. - The
self.retflag is redundant. The signature's status can be determined by checking ifself.datais populated inon_complete.
Here is a refactored version of the class with these changes applied.
class DLLLoadSuspiciousDirectory(Signature):
name = "dllload_suspicious_directory"
description = "A DLL was loaded from a suspicious directory"
severity = 2
confidence = 50
categories = ["side loading"]
authors = ["Kevin Ross"]
minimum = "1.3"
evented = True
enabled = True
ttps = ["T1574"] # MITRE v6,7,8
mbcs = ["F0015"]
def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
Signature.__init__(self, *args, **kwargs)
# Any exclusions added to this list needs to be in lower format.
self.ignore_directories = [
"c:\\windows\\system32\\",
"c:\\windows\\syswow64\\",
"c:\\windows\\",
"c:\\windows\\winsxs\\",
"c:\\program files\\",
"c:\\program files (x86)\\",
"c:\\programdata\\",
]
filter_apinames = set(["DllLoadNotification"])
def on_call(self, call, process):
if not call["status"]:
return None
notificationreason = self.get_argument(call, "NotificationReason")
dllname = self.get_argument(call, "DllName")
if notificationreason == "load":
pname = process["process_name"].lower()
dllnamelower = dllname.lower()
is_ignored = any(dllnamelower.startswith(d) for d in self.ignore_directories)
if not is_ignored:
self.mark_call()
self.data.append(
{
"suspicious_dll_load": (
"Process %s loaded a DLL '%s' from a suspicious directory, "
"this is possibly indicative of DLL side loading/search order hijacking"
)
% (pname, dllname)
}
)
def on_complete(self):
return bool(self.data)|
Looks like a great sig @kevross33 😄 |
Initial signature for one behaviour that appears in some sideloading cases. For this to trigger either zip_compound needs to be used triggering the correct file that then sideloads the DLL or within the chain naturally (i.e. a loader/malicious script/doc etc. pulls down the elements needed itself and sideloads it.
Some other sigs will need investigated for anomalies on this which I am looking into but this should detect some cases.
APT28 sideload sample (dad1a8869c950c2d1d322c8aed3757d3988ef4f06ba230b329c8d510d8d9a027)
