chore(deps): update module github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2 to v2.6.2 [security] #146
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This PR contains the following updates:
v2.6.1->v2.6.2GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
CVE-2026-22703
Impact
A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event.
This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via
--trusted-rootor when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided viaSIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (--use-signing-config=trueand--new-bundle-format=truefor signing,--new-bundle-format=truefor verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values.This issue had previously been fixed in GHSA-8gw7-4j42-w388 but recent refactoring caused a regression. We have added testing to prevent a future regression.
Steps to Reproduce
Patches
Upgrade to Cosign v2.6.2 or Cosign v3.0.4. This does not affect Cosign v1.
Workarounds
You can provide trusted key material via a set of flags under certain conditions. The simplest fix is to upgrade to the latest Cosign v2 or v3 release.
Note that the example below works for
cosign verify,cosign verify-blob,cosign verify-blob-attestation, andcosign verify-attestation`.Release Notes
sigstore/cosign (github.com/sigstore/cosign/v2)
v2.6.2Compare Source
v2.6.2 resolves GHSA-whqx-f9j3-ch6m.
Changes
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