Saddle creates symlinks from this repository into your AI tool config directories (~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor, ~/.gemini, ~/.copilot, ~/.config/opencode). No network requests are made. No credentials are read or stored.
Security fixes are applied to the latest release on main. There are no long-term support branches at this time.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | ✓ Yes |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Report security issues privately by emailing the maintainer directly or using GitHub's private vulnerability reporting.
Include:
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce (or a proof-of-concept)
- The potential impact
- Any suggested remediation (optional)
You should receive an acknowledgement within 72 hours. If you do not, follow up by opening a GitHub issue with subject "Security disclosure follow-up" (without disclosing the vulnerability details).
- Path traversal: crafted rule YAML causing links to be created outside the expected target directories
- Arbitrary code execution triggered by malformed YAML rule files or config files
- Symlink following attacks during install or uninstall that could overwrite unintended files
- A local user with write access to the repo being able to modify what gets linked (this is by design — Saddle is a personal dotfile management tool)
- Symlinks pointing to world-readable files (intended behavior)